

the military equipment for the 8 years of French warfare against much of the local population of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

But in 1954, there were still Americans who believed that active participation in the war by U.S. military forces could save Indochina for France. There were demands for air strikes from the U.S. 7th Fleet, based in the western Pacific. There were hints that U.S. troops might be landed. I was one of several Senators, many of them leading Democrats, who argued vigorously against such an extension of the U.S. involvement. The adverse reaction from so many in Congress and among the general public undoubtedly was a factor in President Eisenhower's rejection of U.S. military involvement in Indochina. The United States did not intervene militarily in 1954. The result was the Geneva conference which provided for the end of French rule over Indochina.

GENEVA SETTLEMENT

But we did pursue and continue U.S. aid directly to much of Indochina. We began extensive financial aid to Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. In the South we established a government which we thought would be favorable to the United States. In fact, we hand-picked from Washington and New York a South Vietnam exile named Diem who had never participated in his country's war against the French and we sent him to South Vietnam, financed him, militarized his regime, and proclaimed through our recognition of his administration that his was an independent government.

He became our agent in South Vietnam. In collaboration with his puppet government, we undertook military activities in South Vietnam that were in violation of the Geneva agreement. Some involved distribution of weapons, others the covert establishment of military installations.

The Geneva agreement had, in the words of the final interpretative declaration, been intended to settle the military hostilities in Indochina and, to quote: "create the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Vietnam." The political settlement was to follow in 1956, when the two military zones of North and South were to be politically united through general elections.

The final declaration of the Geneva Conference called for elections throughout Vietnam in July 1956, to be conducted under the supervision of the International Control Commission. The declaration further called upon officials from North and South to meet to arrange for the election. The specific language of the declaration said:

7. The conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, at the time Vice President Nixon sent up his trial balloon, suggesting that American forces be sent into Indochina, the United States had financed France for 8 years in its effort to regain control over a major colony from they had been ousted by Japan. Few Americans realize today that one very serious drawback to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam today is our record of putting up the money and

all the necessary conditions obtain for free elections shall be held in July 1955, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onward.

However, the United States laid its groundwork for upsetting the elections by saying we would favor them only under the supervision of the United Nations. Since this was not what the agreement provided, we can hardly claim to have adhered either to its purpose or its letter.

By what authority did we propose to amend the unilateral Geneva accords which the signatories to it had agreed to, but which we refused to sign?

On January 22, 1955, C. L. Sulzberger, of the New York Times, reported:

Ngo Dinh Diem has not yet demonstrated any political sex appeal. Foreign observers report with uniformity that he is neither popular nor yet of any apparent use to the cause we advocate. Nevertheless, the United States has decided it must take a calculated risk in Indochina and replace absence of policies with something positive. It is recognized that in July 1956, elections throughout Vietnam, including the populous North, are scheduled under the Geneva agreement. Therefore, desperate efforts must be made during the intervening period to check Ho Chi Minh's advances.

President Eisenhower reported in his "Mandate for Change" that every expert agreed that Ho's candidates would win at least 80 percent of the vote if the election was held.

As a result, when officials of North Vietnam asked Diem in the summer of 1955 to send representatives to arrange the election, he did not even respond, except to say that he, like the United States, favored only elections supervised by the United Nations.

It was also the intention of the agreement to remove all three states of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam from cold war competition by forbidding foreign military bases in any of them, and forbidding interference in their internal affairs by any signatory of the Geneva Conference.

When it suited our purpose, we evaded these principles and provisions by pointing out that we did not sign the Geneva agreement. And when it suited other of our purposes, we protested loudly, as a rationalization for our own violation, that North Vietnam was violating it.

U.S. INTERVENTION

This was the situation that faced John Kennedy when he became President. The United States had a large economic and military aid program in South Vietnam. We had hundreds of military officers and noncoms there serving as so-called military advisers to the local forces of the South.

But despite the constant buildup of our military equipment and economic help, Diem was losing support and control. Finally, in the fall of 1963, he was judged totally incompetent to continue running the country, and a coup against

him was encouraged, and perhaps even planned by American officials in Saigon.

President Johnson was confronted with the same deteriorating situation, but now there were more than 12,000 American military advisers on hand, and they were moving into the role of active participants. The Government in Saigon was a rotating one, and military faction after military faction succeeded each other in coup after coup until most of the world lost track entirely of who was in charge in South Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese generals, who were entirely the product of American military training and support, were joined by many Americans in believing that only a massive U.S. military effort could save the South from being taken over entirely by Communist-led rebels.

In August of 1964, in a naval action that still is veiled in considerable mystery, North Vietnamese PT boats fired upon U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. The American response, however, was not only to fire back—which we had a right and a clear duty to do as a matter of self-defense—but also to send aircraft to raid the PT boat bases in North Vietnam, itself—which right we did not have under any tenet of international law.

At that time, the administration asked and received from Congress a resolution supporting and approving "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

I opposed that resolution because the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief, does not need any approval or authorization from Congress to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States. But if he wants to undertake a war to prevent what he believes may be outright aggression, he must have a declaration of war, specifying who the aggressor is.

Under the Constitution Congress has no authority by resolution to seek to give him the power to make war without a declaration of war.

If Congress is going to make war, Congress must declare war. It is not a power that Congress can delegate. The President has no power to make war under the Constitution in the absence of a declaration of war under article I, section 8 of the Constitution.

Yet that resolution was invoked 6 months later when the United States began regular and very large-scale air attacks against North Vietnam, attacks which continued on a wartime frequency for 11 months.

It was in August of 1964 that for the first time we introduced the subject of the Vietnam war in the United Nations. But it was not to seek U.N. jurisdiction over the entire dispute, as I believe we are obliged to do under the charter. We only accused North Vietnam of firing on U.S. vessels on the high seas. The charges we have made for years that North Vietnam was violating the Geneva agreement have never been brought before the U.N. at all, although they are what the war is supposed to be about, according to our official spokesmen. Yet

we know that our own course of military action has also been in clear violation of the Geneva accords.

In the year and a half since the congressional resolution, the war in Vietnam has steadily risen in scope and intensity, despite the many assurances that no important increase in our forces there was contemplated. American heavy bomber raids have expanded into Laos, although the news stories that report them also say that no official announcement of the raids can be made because they are forbidden under the 1962 agreement on Laos. We have officially announced a policy of pursuing Vietcong forces into Cambodia, thus completing the expansion of the war into all parts of Indochina.

What has happened since August 1964, is that the United States has effectively replaced France in Indochina.

We are doing indirectly what John Foster Dulles, in 1954, tried to get us to do directly, when he engaged in secret diplomacy by going to Prime Minister Churchill and Anthony Eden in London. He wanted them to enter into a deal whereby they would pledge British troops. Our Secretary of State, without even one second of consultation in advance with Congress, agreed to pledge American troops. Then he would go across the Channel to recommend to the French Government that it continue the war in Indochina with the support of British and American troops.

The American people were saved from that colossal mistake, not by the American Secretary of State, but by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Churchill rejected the proposal on its merits, and then said, in effect, to the American Secretary of State, "Do you not think that would be deceiving your Congress?" He knew what Dulles would then do. He would come to Congress and present to us the agreement, and tell us how difficult it was to negotiate and how hard he worked on the agreement; and, of course, we could not let him down.

That is the argument that we hear in the Foreign Relations Committee time and time again, when we are faced with an accomplished fact, after the State Department has engaged in one secret diplomatic act after another and then comes and tells us about it afterwards.

The American people are entitled to know in advance what their Secretary of State is up to.

Mr. President, our military forces, not those of South Vietnam, are the key military elements. It is our air power that rules the skies over North as well as South Vietnam, and over Laos; and it is our economic aid—now at a level of \$600 million a year—that is keeping South Vietnam's economy afloat. The \$12 billion American war effort in Vietnam is having the side effect of forcing us to double our economic aid to South Vietnam to keep inflation within bounds. But even so, disaffection for the Government is so extensive that most observers on all sides agree that a truce, a cease-fire, or any cessation of the war would cause its collapse by removing the necessity of military control of the country.

CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS

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For the past seven months, the administration has been sending emissaries to every corner of the world in an effort to develop peace negotiations. Air raids on the North have been halted; but there lurks the threat of what President Johnson has already called "hard new steps" to be taken by this country if no peace feelers are developed. Moreover, although Presidential emissaries have been sent to Europe and Africa and to some countries in Asia, none has been sent to North Vietnam or to China. We have no peace to seek in Europe or Africa. What we want those countries to do is to go to Hanoi and Peking for us, and urge those countries to cease their support of the Vietcong or negotiate.

But we have not made use of the one international forum created for just such international problems—the United Nations. The fall session of the General Assembly came and went without a word from the United States about what action the Assembly might take in Vietnam.

The Security Council can be summoned overnight, and has been in other disputes involving other countries, and it can be summoned on the basis of only a letter from the United States asking that it meet to consider the threat to the peace in southeast Asia. It can take jurisdiction and it can act on such a threat even where nonmembers are concerned, as in this case.

No such letter or petition has ever been sent by the United States and until it is, it cannot be said that the United States has applied the treaty of the United Nations Charter to our dispute in Vietnam.

That is my answer to the President's reference to the United Nations in his state of the Union speech. I do not believe that he consciously sought to confuse, but his reference to the United Nations in his speech confused many, for many have said to me since, "Have we not taken the matter to the United Nations?" The President said so.

I repeat; We have never taken to the United Nations, by the way of the action called for by the charter, the threat to the peace of the world in southeast Asia.

It is a simple thing to do. Many months ago, the President asked me to prepare a legal memorandum for him on this matter of law, and I prepared it for him, and set out, at his request, a set of alternatives that would meet our obligation under the United Nations Charter.

If any American thinks that we have used the procedures of the United Nations in connection with the Vietnam issue, he could not be more mistaken, for we have not. We have had informal discussions which our ambassador has carried on behind the scenes in the United Nations, under the direction of the President of the United States; but that ambassador, a former Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, knows that informal, behind-the-scenes discussions cannot replace the filing of a complaint, the filing of a petition, the filing of pleadings before a court which has the jurisdiction to adjudicate.

I have great respect and regard for Ambassador Goldberg, but I feel sorry for him. It is too bad that this great

American is kept in a position by his juridical course of action clearly called for by the United Nations Charter.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

With each passing month, and with each escalation on land or by air, the United States is sinking deeper into the bottomless pit of a land war in Asia. Application of our unchallenged air power is not accomplishing what was advertised for it—it is not effectively crippling the rebel war effort and it is not driving the Vietcong or North Vietnam to the bargaining table. In fact, the Vietcong control more land area in South Vietnam today, in spite of all our military intervention, than they did a year ago today. A dispatch in the New York Times of January 2 tells us that after a year of constant bombing in South Vietnam, 83,000 individual aircraft missions were flown against targets in the South. The Defense Department will reveal no figures on the civilian casualties from these air sorties, but the story does report our officials as admitting that they are largely responsible for the 730,000 refugees now flooding into refugee camps in various parts of South Vietnam.

That needs to be stressed, because the American people are not fully aware of it. The State Department and the Defense Department, in the past, have propagandized the American people with regard to the tactics of the Vietcong—and they have been horrible, inexcusable tactics; I yield to no one in this administration in my criticism of Communist tactics. But, Mr. President, I do not like to see my country follow the same tactics, or similar tactics. The Pentagon has sought to leave the impression that the great refugee problem in southeast Asia is of Vietcong making. But now, at long last, the administration admits that the 730,000 refugees now flooding into refugee camps in South Vietnam are the product of American bombing in South Vietnam.

I digress for a moment to say that I shall never be able to understand how our country can support a scorched earth policy in South Vietnam.

As an American, I am ashamed that my Government is following a policy of burning and poisoning the ricefields of South Vietnam. I commend the group of American scientists which, in the last couple of days, issued a paper in protest against the military tactics of the United States in South Vietnam in using poison and other destructive means to destroy the rice crops of South Vietnam.

Mr. President, with that announcement, every church bell in America should have tolled. With that announcement, every clergyman in America should have called upon his congregation to drop to its knees. Much of the warmaking policies of the United States in South Vietnam cannot be reconciled with our religious principles. They violate morality. They represent a horrendous example of man's inhumanity to man.

Is it not interesting that we deplore the brutality of other forces, but forget what is being practiced by our own country.

Mr. President, it is not right. It is not necessary. It should be stopped. Instead of picking up the newspaper and reading that we are sending thousands more Americans to South Vietnam, we should be picking up the paper and reading that, at long last, the President of the United States has sent the formal resolution to the United Nations asking for multilateral action on South Vietnam in accordance with the rules and procedures of international law, the tenets of which we have pledged ourselves by our own signature to support.

Mr. President, the story to which I referred in the New York Times goes on, to say:

There are those who regret this, but there are also those who appear to believe that victory will depend on forcing large numbers of peasants to move from their ancestral homes in Vietcong-dominated areas to Government-dominated areas. A qualified source said that "victory will take place when the population turns against the enemy."

Five years ago, we tried herding the peasants into so-called strategic hamlets for much the same reason. The program was a total failure and resulted in greater animosity against the South Vietnamese Government and against the United States. Now we are going to try bombing them into loyalty and love for the United States and this little tyrant we are supporting called General Ky.

Whatever the limitations of the United Nations, it could hardly do worse in bringing peace or freedom to Vietnam than we have done alone.

Our problem in Vietnam is to stop the fighting. We cannot do that alone and the Communists cannot do it. I fear that the war will not stop there until some outside force is brought in to separate the parties, police a cease-fire, and take over responsibility for South Vietnam. This is a primary function of the United Nations, if not to organize such a force directly to direct some other international body to do it.

After all, the natural military disadvantages that recommend against a U.S. commitment on the mainland in Asia are compounded by the disaster of a white Western nation trying what all other white Western nations have abandoned, and this is fighting alone in a war against Asians. Asians are going to run their own affairs however long it may take, and whether doing so requires Communist or non-Communist leadership. In my opinion, we are making China's job easier by escalating the war and making China the defender of Asia against Western interests and claims.

And all the denials from the administration do not and cannot obscure the fact that we are in Vietnam today because we seek to maintain an American military position in southeast Asia.

AMERICAN SANCTUARY IN THAILAND

Let the administration tell the American people the facts about our installations in Thailand. Let the administration tell the American people the facts about our turning Thailand into an American sanctuary, a process which began in earnest in 1962.

has a great deal to say in discussions on foreign policy about sanctuaries. What has the war wing of the Republican Party along with the war wing of the Democratic Party got to say about America's maintaining a military sanctuary in Thailand?

I shall be glad to have the administration meet that challenge, because the American people are entitled to know the minutiae of detail concerning American military policies in Thailand. This is undeniably true: Thailand has become a military dependency of the United States—and all of Asia knows it. The Asians know it, but the American people have had the facts kept from them.

WHAT IS VICTORY?

Our administration cannot justify bogging the Nation down in a 50-year war in Asia. That is the time it will take, if we continue to raise the level of the fighting in order to drive someone else to a surrender table. If we ever do win the military victories necessary to force North Vietnam or China to a surrender table—I believe that we will, although some believe it is doubtful—we will then have to police Asia with tens of thousands of American soldiers and spend billions and billions of dollars enforcing the surrender for the next 50 years.

I shall continue opposing increases in the level of the war. I shall continue to oppose sending more troops, in the absence of a declaration of war, to fight and die in a dispute that has not yet been laid before the United Nations.

I am as much against communism as President Johnson. But war, killing, destruction, and foreign occupation of southeast Asia will not defeat communism there. A continued unilateral show of American military power will not produce peace; the best it will ever produce will be a stronger determination within Asia to drive us out.

Mr. President, recently, as chairman of a Senate parliamentary delegation, I returned to the United States after a 5-week tour through Asia. We visited Japan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Israel. Nowhere during my travels did I find real support for American policy in South Vietnam. Some lip service, yes. The attitude was: It is your problem, we hope you will get it over with soon, and get it over with without involving China in a war. They have their eyes on the danger of a United States-Chinese war. They know very well—and the American people who seek to wave our flag into tatters in regard to encouraging a United States-Chinese war ought to recognize this—that a United States-Chinese war would be the beginning of world war III. It is my opinion that out of that war would come no victors.

Therefore, I shall continue to oppose the foreign policy of my Government in Vietnam unless and until a formal declaration of war is passed by the Congress. I take it for granted that the only country against which there could possibly be made even a prima facie case—and I doubt that—would be North Vietnam.

existing facts, I would vote against a declaration of war. But once declared, I would then join in insisting that the American people unite behind the President, because then it would become our duty to do so under the Constitution, and to try to get the war over as quickly as possible. Until then, I think it is our duty to seek the substitution of international law for the jungle law of military force.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that certain material referred to in my speech and bearing on certain points in my speech, consisting of newspaper and magazine articles and editorials, be inserted at the conclusion of my speech.

Continued

JAN 19 1966

The estimates here are that a wide perimeter around Saigon, including from 6 to 8 million people, can be secured with three American divisions on the outer perimeter, five South Vietnamese divisions on the inner perimeter and a well-organized militia.

The task in the northeast around the Cha Lai-Danang area is perhaps easier, for there the Americans have the sea at their backs and sufficient firepower to protect themselves against almost anything that can be thrown against them.

This is certainly not a pleasant prospect, but it is one alternative and it is being discussed here. Everybody seems to have his own personal nightmare about Vietnam. Some fear the President will go too far, others that he will not go far enough to win.

THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE

But there is a third. This is that the President will adjust neither his ends nor his means or not adjust one or the other enough to produce a realistic balance. In that event, we could easily keep on trying to destroy the enemy's forces on the ground and take so many casualties in the process that the American people and politicians would force a withdrawal and we would not even save the cities.

In any event, the present situation cannot go on for very long. Honest men can easily differ both about the ends and the means of our policy here, but on this central point of the need to balance the one to the other, both the hawks and the doves ought to be able to agree.

The importance of Thailand in United States strategic planning is manifest. Air and port facilities are being steadily expanded and the brilliant Maj. Gen. Richard Stilwell, former chief of staff to the U.S. commander in chief in Saigon, has been posted as senior American officer in Thailand.

It is necessary to distinguish from each other the cases of Laos and Cambodia. North Vietnam has always disregarded the 1962 Geneva agreement to neutralize Laos, thus prompting Washington to strike back. Unfortunately, it was plain when the Geneva accord was still being negotiated that it would be valueless. It would have been wiser to partition Laos.

It is understandable that stepped-up operations should be contemplated by Washington for east Laos because the other side so blatantly violates its Geneva pledge; but it would be unwise to introduce regular American units.

The kind of operation in which we now engage in Laos could be improved without open intervention. The Communists, indeed, intervene there openly but North Vietnamese fade into the background easily. Americans would not.

THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM

As for Cambodia, the doctrine of hot pursuit there could lead to unforeseeable repercussions. American commanders are convinced that Communist supplies and reinforcements come through Cambodia and that Sihanoukville in the south is a storage center for Vietcong arms unloaded from coastal junks. This is denied by Prince Sihanouk and American reporters who searched the area found nothing. Yet it is possible Sihanouk has lost administrative control of Cambodia's Vietnamese border area into which guerrillas appear to have been retreating and where hot pursuit is threatened.

MacArthur unsuccessfully sought permission to employ hot pursuit against the Chinese in Korea. French commanders fighting Algerian nationalists wanted authorization from Paris to invade Tunisia and Morocco to clean up regions where the Algerian forces were openly training. This was refused—although one air unit bombed a

Tunisian town. The United States at that time strongly opposed French ideas of hot pursuit much as France today opposes our belligerent intimations vis-a-vis Laos and Cambodia.

OUR TARNISHED IMAGE

In pondering these problems we should study both military and diplomatic aspects. Our image, recently improved in Japan and Indonesia, still remains tarnished. We should not blacken it.

It is dangerous to allow field commanders to decide when to cross an international border. It would be wiser to accumulate evidence of frontier violations by Vietcong units and then apply pressure on Cambodia through the U.N. At least such a first step is not irrevocable.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 26, 1965]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS: NO TIME FOR NEW RISKS

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

PARIS.—There are hints that the southeast Asian war may be geographically escalated even if the tempo of fighting in South Vietnam and the bombing of North Vietnam are not scaled upward. Leakage of Communist manpower and equipment through eastern Laos and, it is claimed, through Cambodia, plus use of both countries as safe havens for Vietcong units seem to be leading toward a new crisis.

The United States, operating primarily through the CIA, has sought to help Royal Laotian forces and to dam the flow of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Air operations against this Laotian corridor have been mounted both from South Vietnam and from Thailand where Thai and Lao pilots have aided American fliers. Small aircraft support agents and counter guerrilla forces in eastern Laos.

UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS

However, these efforts have not succeeded in choking off the "trail." As a consequence there is talk of sending American units into strategically important east Laos although, so far, there has been no known decision. Furthermore, our forces in Vietnam have seemingly been authorized to pursue the Vietcong across the Cambodian frontier if they retreat into that neutral territory.

There are evident dangers involved if the United States either decides to send regular military units into east Laos or to permit American or Saigon forces to carry the fighting to Cambodia. Militarily such actions may commend themselves but, in diplomatic and propaganda terms, is the game worth the candle?

PROVOCATION TO CHINA?

Extension of the formal operational theater might provoke China to launch massive guerrilla assaults against Thailand through Laos or northeastern Burma. Thailand has been developed as a base to support U.S. defense efforts in Laos and one may wonder whether it is useful to risk trouble there. Peiping already promotes a "Free Thai" movement and Chinese officers are undergoing mass training in the Thai language.

At some point, then, either the politicians or the soldiers are going to have to do some adjusting. If they will not provide the means, which means the lives, to destroy the enemy's forces, then they will have to limit their ends.

The vast majority of the South Vietnamese people live in the area of Saigon, in the cities of the northeast and the provincial capitals. These areas can be defended and fed without anything like the losses involved in trying to carry the battle to the enemy in the hills and rice paddies.

STATEMENT OF U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM BY
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 DECEMBER 22, 1965

Under no circumstance should we escalate the war in Vietnam. Our position there is indefensible. Contrary to Government propaganda we were not invited by, and have no commitment to any representative or responsible Government of South Vietnam. We are there as an aggressor in violation of our treaty obligation under the United Nations Charter. We have not observed either the letter or the spirit of our obligations with respect to our actions in Vietnam. As a result, we have the opposition of not only the entire Communist world but the rest of the world as well, with few minor exceptions.

The facts are, the Geneva Treaty of 1954, after the defeat of the French, affirmed the independence of the colonial Government of Vietnam and called for an end to hostilities. The British and the Russians were cochairmen of that Conference. An interim trusteeship was agreed upon whereby the French would preside in the south and the Viet Minh in the north for 2 years, ending in a national election in 1956 when the Vietnamese people would choose their own Government. The United States-Vietnam lobby did not permit that election to be held knowing that Ho Chi Minh, the Communist leader of the north, was so popular he would unquestionably win the election. As a matter of fact, John F. Kennedy, then Senator, in a major speech in the Senate in April 1954, warned against any negotiated solution that would allow participation in the Vietnamese Government by Ho Chi Minh. The Communists, he said, would eventually take over because they were so popular. In his memoirs Eisenhower stated that had an election been held in Vietnam, as provided in the Geneva accord, an estimated 80 percent would have voted for Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader.

Diem was brought to the United States in 1950 from a 17-year self-imposed exile, under the auspices of Michigan State University, and here he found strong support in the hierarchy of the Catholic church, his brother being a Catholic bishop. Cardinal Spellman became a strong supporter, also Justices Douglas, Joseph Kennedy, and his son, John F. Kennedy, General Lansdale (the CIA man in Saigon), CIA Director Allen Dulles, General Donovan, and other strong anti-Communists. They were largely responsible for bringing about Diem's ascension to the Premiership of South Vietnam in July 1954.

From his first day in office he set about crushing opposition and concentrating power in small nepotist groups. Diem's targets included the private armies of the religious sects and the anti-Communist Vietnamese leaders, who were also anti-Diem. He wasn't looking for popularity. He knew his support was slim—that he would have trouble with the majority of the population who had been supporting the Viet Minh in the long war against the French; therefore, force was the only way he could effectively reach his people for the democratic alternative. Due to the paid propaganda of the United States-Vietnam lobby his dictatorial tactics were not widely reported in the American press until 3 years later when he fell from power and he and his brother were assassinated by the military within his own government. Since that time South Vietnam has been unable to develop a stable or responsible government, as evidenced by the many changes in leadership.

The South Vietnamese Communists, with the help of the North Vietnamese, defeated the French. They are now fighting for the independence of their country against the non-Communist South Vietnamese. In short, it is a civil war with the Vietcong supported by North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese held together and supported by the United States. The South Vietnamese Catholics (about 10 percent of the population), property owners and business interests in the large cities are the strong anti-Communist supporters of South Vietnam, and are the minority.

We have provided large amounts of military aid to the South Vietnamese since the administration came into office we did not furnish American troops to help fight their war, until it was apparent they were being defeated. We have gradually taken over the direction of their Government as well as their war until now it has become an American war rather than a Vietnamese war. Why go to Vietnam to drive the Communists out when we can't get them out of Cuba, 90 miles from our shore?

The North Vietnamese supplied troops to the Vietcong only after American troops entered the war in large numbers and we commenced heavy bombing of North Vietnam and the Vietcong. It was then that China and Russia publicly announced they would give all the military and economic aid necessary to the North Vietnamese in order to defeat the U.S. aggressors. As a result, we now have aligned against us the powerful countries of China and Russia, including all the Communist world, with practically no support from the rest of the world in spite of Rusk's and McNamara's recent appeals to NATO. Under these conditions we cannot win. You cannot defeat people in a jungle war where the majority is against you and it is impossible to tell your friends from your enemies.

We are rapidly destroying the very country we propose to save—South Vietnam—as well as killing hundreds of its men, women, and children by our incessant and heavy bombing of the Vietcong. We are adding to our burdens thousands of refugees that we must feed, clothe, and house. What would the situation be if North Vietnam, with the help of China and Russia, should retaliate by bombing Saigon and the other principal cities in South Vietnam? Even if we won their freedom and turned the country over to them they have no capacity for democracy or self-rule.

With a bigger war shaping up on the ground and fighting 9,000 miles away logistics are almost an insoluble problem. With troop strength only 158,000 in November our logistic needs shot up from 75,000 tons in February to 700,000 tons in November. The jet aircraft are burning more than a million gallons of fuel a month. Ports are clogged—ships wait 10 days to 2 months to unload cargoes. What will the situation be if we undertake to double or quadruple our fighting forces, planes, helicopters, et cetera?

Our sense of negotiating a peace reveals our total insensibility to the other parties' problem. Two antagonists cannot negotiate their own peace terms. The matter should be turned over to an impartial body, like the United Nations, each party agreeing to a cease-fire and to accept any terms decided upon by the impartial body.

If the war is escalated, before many months the United States will probably be required to go on a war footing and our present domestic prosperity will be ended. Inflationary pressures will greatly increase and the position of the dollar in the world market will be further jeopardized unless we bring about a balanced budget through increasing taxes and cutting back domestic programs.

It may be the North Vietnamese do not control the course of the war—it is now in the hands of the Chinese and the Russians. As cochairman of the Geneva Conference the Russians have refused to take any part in bringing about a peaceful settlement. They may be glad to have us tied down in a most unpopular war in Asia, which greatly weakens our position in NATO as well as throughout the world. They must avoid giving support to Peiping's charges that they are conniving with Mr. Johnson to end the war. To do otherwise would greatly weaken their own leadership in the Communist world. It would seem we have fallen into a trap that neither China nor Russia is willing to let us get out of with either face-saving or victory.

We could not have chosen anywhere in the world a more difficult place to challenge the Communists and more to the liking of China—on her border. How could we have been so blind and misinformed. The decisions were made by the President and a handful of advisers in the White House, State and Defense Departments, without debate or prior approval of the Congress. This is dictatorship that has no place in our democracy. The public has not been advised as to what was taking place. They have been misinformed and brainwashed to such an extent that opponents are accused of being disloyal and supporting the enemy and patriotism has come to mean unquestioning support of the administration. Blindly accepting the Government's position in Vietnam is more senseless than blindly accepting its domestic programs because mistakes in Vietnam can be far more disastrous. The real patriots today are the Members of Congress and other public leaders who have the courage to oppose the administration and urge it not to escalate the war but to get out of Vietnam at the earliest possible date. This would be the least costly from every standpoint—even our world prestige would be enhanced.

If our leaders insist on escalating this war to a finish it is likely to be the most disastrous of the wars we have fought, measured by cost, loss of life and prestige throughout the world, and the most futile. It could lead to World War III—the United States alone fighting the Communist world. This could trigger an atomic war which all the world dreads.

The real tragedy is the useless suffering of the millions of our people whose sons, husbands, and brothers are drawn into this conflict unwillingly and are killed or maimed for life, not in defense of their country but because of our incompetent leadership.

Peace in the world will never be brought about by aggression or by rash and inept remarks like McNamara made at the Paris Conference of NATO when he urged our European allies to plan now to meet a Chinese military threat to their own security within 5 years. We are justly accused of trying to utilize NATO as a tool for our anti-Chinese policy of aggression in Asia. Such remarks make it impossible for us to negotiate our way out of Vietnam.

The alternative is to recognize China and bring her into the United Nations before she becomes an atomic power in 3 to 5 years. Even her avowed enemies, India and Russia, have voted for her inclusion in the U.N.

With all our domestic problems—mass poverty, unemployment, riots in our cities and the highest rate of juvenile delinquency and crime throughout the world—who are we to be the world's policeman?

The billions being wasted on the war in Vietnam, if used to eliminate mass poverty and illiteracy in the undeveloped countries, would do far more than aggression to prevent the spread of communism.

We must recognize that it is just as important, if not more so, for the Communists to save face in Asia as it is for the United States. We should be less interested in saving face and more interested in saving lives. Great nations over the years have survived face-saving and withdrawing from an untenable position. It can be done with dignity. Certainly we are a sufficiently great nation to relieve the world of the fear of war that is so terrifying. Not only would we save face, but we would win approval of the world and gain in stature.

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